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The Private Enforcement of Public
Laws in Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services

I. INTRODUCTION

"We are a nation of employees."' For many of us, work is the most
important activity of our lives, and whether by choice or not, we often spend
the majority of our waking hours at the office

In light of this reality,

Congress and our state legislatures have granted us the right to work in an
environment free from discrimination.' In recent years, lawmakers have
enacted increasingly expansive laws to protect us at work, and employees
are taking advantage of these laws.4

Like other litigation, employment litigation is an onerous and expensive
process that employers would rather avoid.'

Busy courts would also

1. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2
(4th ed. 1998).
2. See id.
3. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 420 (1999). Federal statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-7 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, national origin, and religion); Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (prohibiting age discrimination); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability). The
Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12990-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) is
the California statute governing discrimination.
4. See Marcella Noemi Siderman, Comment, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth
Saving: Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title Protections,47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1885, 1887
(2000) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, reprinted in notes following 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (increasing remedies available to victims of discrimination)); see also Evan J.
Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration v. Employment Litigation, DiSp. RESOL. J., May 1999, at 78
(discussing the recent popularity of employment lawsuits). As of 1999, there were more than
twenty-five thousand wrongful discharge and discrimination cases pending in state and federal
courts nationwide. Id. The EEOC, state and local agencies are also busy investigating more than
fifty thousand employment discrimination claims. Id.
5. See generally Moohr, supra note 3, at 401-04 (contrasting litigation and arbitration). The
average duration of an employment case is three to five years, and the average award is $700,000.
Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 78. An award in excess of one million dollars would not be unusual. Id.
An Orange County jury recently award $5,219,020 to a victim of sex discrimination. Rayburn v.
Vons Co. Inc., 2000 WL 796869 (T.D. Cal. Jury).

appreciate seeing fewer employment discrimination cases.6 Arbitration has

surfaced as a favorable alternative to the litigation of employment
discrimination claims.7 Unfortunately, after a dispute has arisen, the parties
are not inclined to agree to arbitration, employees in particular want their

day in court.'
Consequently, employers have begun to require that
prospective employees sign mandatory employment arbitration agreements
as a condition of employment.9 These predispute arbitration agreements are
very controversial, particularly when they encompass statutory
discrimination claims. °
Arbitration agreements, frequently found in employment contracts,
generally require that all disputes arising out of the employment relationship
be decided through binding arbitration.' Employees typically disfavor
compulsory arbitration, because it is often quite expensive, and they lose the
rights and protections guaranteed in a judicial forum.'" Employers, on the
other hand, are generally quite fond of arbitration, because it provides
confidentiality, is generally less expensive, more efficient, and more final
than litigating in a judicial forum. 3 This is due to the relatively informal
6. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 8-9 (1997).
7. Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 78. "[A]rbitration is quickly becoming the primary source of
workplace justice in America," largely because it limits the employers exposure to liability in
lawsuits arising out of the employment relationship. Katherine V.W. Stone, Employment Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS
27-28 (Adrienne E. Eaton and Jeffery H. Keefe, eds., 1999) [hereinafter Stone, Employment
Arbitration]. Furthermore, employers are more likely to prevail in an arbitration. Id. at 34.
8. Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 78.
9. BALES, supra note 7, at 2; see also Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 27-28;
Lisa Bingham & Denise R. Charchere, Dispute Resolution in Employment: The Need for Research,
in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS 99 (Adrienne E. Eaton and Jeffery H.
Keefe, eds., 1999) (half of "large" private employers require agreements). The California Supreme
Court defines such mandatory employment arbitration agreements as "an agreement by an employee
to arbitrate wrongful termination or employment discrimination claims rather than filing suit in
court, which an employer imposes on a prospective or current employee as a condition of
employment." Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000).
10. See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 3 (arguing that arbitration of statutory employment claims
compromises their public policy goals of eliminating discrimination in the workplace); Stone,
Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 28 (criticizing mandatory employment arbitration
agreements because they may deprive employees of their rights under employment discrimination
laws and statutes).
11. See Stuart L. Bass, What the Courts Say About Mandatory Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov.
1999, at 26; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036-37 (1996) [hereinafter
Stone, Yellow Dog].
12. For example, they lose the protections provided by legal rules of procedure and evidence, as
well as the right to a jury trial and judicial review. See Andrea Fitz, The Debate Over Mandatory
Arbitration in Employment Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 78.
13. "From management's point of view, a mandatory arbitration program speeds up the dispute
resolution process, minimizes the expense of discovery, reduces internal and legal costs, ensures the
preservation of confidentiality (thereby minimizing the risks of adverse publicity), and avoids the
possibility of runaway jury verdicts." Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 81.
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nature of arbitration, where damage awards tend to be low and judicial
review is rare.'4 However, in California at least, this may be less true now
than it was prior to August 24, 2000, when the California Supreme Court
decided Armendariz v. FoundationHealth Psychcare Services, Inc.'5

In Armendariz, the California Supreme Court held that employers can
mandate an agreement to arbitrate as a condition of employment, subject to
certain conditions.' 6 These conditions make employment arbitration more
fair, but it also makes arbitration more expensive, time intensive, and less
final. 7 The court has imposed procedural safeguards on mandatory
employment arbitrations, circumscribing the employer's advantage in
arbitration, and making this particular type of arbitration look more like
traditional litigation.'8
This Note will analyze the court's decision and its influence on
employment arbitration in California. Part II will briefly describe the
arbitration process.' 9

Part III will review the statutory and case law

governing employment arbitration."

Part IV will analyze the court's

decision in Armendariz v. FoundationHealth PsychcareServices, Inc.2 Part

V will consider the consequences of this decision.22 Part VI will briefly
conclude.23

14. See Shane Anderies, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Individual Employment
ContractsAfter Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.: A Note on Armendariz v. Foundation Health
PsychcareServices, Inc., 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 765, 795-96 (2000).
15. 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
16. The court held that an arbitration agreement will be binding if the arbitration permits the
employee to vindicate statutory rights. Safeguards required to meet this end include a neutral
arbitrator, adequate discovery, the availability of all remedies that would be available in court, a
written agreement to facilitate judicial review, and limitations on the employee's cost to bring claims
in an arbitral forum. Id. at 674.
17. See infra Part V.A-B.
18. See Fitz, supra note 13, at 78; Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage From Using Mandatory Arbitrationfor Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399,
426-27 (2000) (discussing procedural safeguards similar to those imposed by the Armendariz court,
adopted by the Taskforce on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment in a document entitled
A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship [hereinafter Due Process Protocol], reprinted in Arnold M. Zack,
Agreements to Arbitrate and the Waiver of Rights Under Employment Law, in EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS 67, 90-94 (Adrienne E. Eaton and Jeffery H. Keefe,
eds., 1999).
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Pan V.
23. See infra Part VI.
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II. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

A mandatory employment arbitration agreement typically arises when
an employer requires an employee to "agree" to reconcile future
employment disputes by arbitration." Arbitration is a "private dispute
resolution procedure, designed by the parties to serve their particular

needs."25 The parties select the arbitrator, determine the issues which will be
arbitrated, the procedure which will govern the arbitration, the amount of
money in controversy, the remedies available, and how the costs will be
apportioned. 6 The arbitrator, who may not even be familiar with
employment law," will proceed to hear arguments, review evidence, and
then render a decision.
A formal written record and court reporters are

typically not present in arbitration, and legal rules of evidence do not usually
apply.29 Despite the absence of these procedural safeguards, most
arbitrations are definite and final as to the matters submitted.30

For the employer especially, there are several benefits associated with
arbitration.3' First, there is no sympathetic jury to grant a large punitive
damage award in an arbitration.2 Second, arbitration, unlike litigation, is

24. BALES, supra note 7, at 3. "Agree" is probably not a properly descriptive word. Employers
require that employees "agree" to arbitrate future disputes. If employees refuse, they will likely lose
their jobs. See Zack, supra note 19, at 67.
25. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 199 (1992).
26. JOHN W. COOLEY, THE ARBITRATOR'S HANDBOOK 2-5 (1998).
27. There is no requirement that the parties select a qualified arbitrator. One study reveals that
16% of employment arbitrators have never read a judicial opinion about Title VII and 40% do not
read labor advance sheets to keep up with developments under Title VII, yet half of these arbitrators
believe they are professionally competent to decide the cases before them. Julian J. Moore, Note,
Arbitral Review (or Lack Thereof): Examining the Procedural Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory
Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572, 1589-90 (2000) (citing Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in Proceedings of the Twenty-eighth
Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 59, 71-72 (1975)).
28. COOLEY, supra note 27, at 2.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. Professional associations have recommended minimum procedural safeguards that
should be present when employees are compelled to arbitrate employment claims as a condition of
employment. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Due Process Protocol, supra note 19;
JAMS/Endispute Issues Minimum Standards for Employment Arbitration, 6 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 50, 50 (1995); Commission on the Future of Labor-Management Relations, U.S.
Dept. of Labor and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Report and Recommendations: Executive Summary
30-31 (1994) [hereinafter Dunlop Report]. The Armendariz court adopted many of the
recommended safeguards including provisions for neutral arbitrator(s), discovery, statutory
remedies, written awards, limited judicial review, and minimal forum fees for the employee.
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 2000).
31. See Zack, supra note 19, at 67.
32. See BALES, supra note 7, at 32. Employers find the jury system unpredictable as jurors are
likely to be peers of the employees, and decide cases on sympathy rather than legal merit. Id. at 9
(citing Richard A. Bales and Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment Arbitration in the NonUnion Sector, 45 LAB. L.J. 627, 633 (1994)).
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private, shielding the parties from public scrutiny.33 Arbitration also gives
the parties control over the dispute resolution process, and as the party with
superior bargaining power, the employer will probably control the process.'
The parties are free to select a qualified neutral with specific expertise

relevant to their dispute, and grant the arbitrator flexibility in tailoring an
award to the specific circumstances of the dispute."

Perhaps the greatest

advantage of arbitration is that the process is relatively inexpensive because
it is reasonably expeditious, informal, and final.36
Of course, there are also limitations associated with arbitration.37 For
example, there is no guarantee that the privately selected arbitrator will be a

competent decision maker,38 and despite his competence, he is likely to favor
the employer as a potential source of future business.39 Arbitrators are also

not bound by precedent, leading to lack of uniformity in the enforcement of
employment laws."0 Additionally, arbitrations typically have limited
discovery, relaxed rules of evidence, and no opportunity for meaningful
judicial review of legal issues.' Listed above as an advantage, the finality of
an arbitration can also be a disadvantage, because even clearly erroneous
decisions cannot be overturned by courts. 2 Finally, because arbitration is a
private affair, there is no way to ensure that public interests are being
respected. 3

33. Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 81.
34. See Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 52.
35. COOLEY, supra note 27, at 5. Consequently, an arbitrator will be more knowledgeable, and
perhaps better qualified to settle the dispute than an Article III judge. See Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("[t]he ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same
experience and competence" as an arbitrator). While this is true with respect to collective bargaining
agreements, it is questionable whether arbitrators are qualified to resolve public, statutory claims.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1998) (statutory claims not presumed to
be arbitrable).
36. COOLEY, supra note 27, at 5.
37. The Supreme Court has recognized the limitations of arbitration. It has noted:
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
ultimate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury .... Arbitrators do not have
the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and
judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial.
Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
38. See supra note 28.
39. Fitz, supra note 13, at 78 (the employer is more likely to participate in future arbitrations).
The majority of arbitrators are male. Moore, supra note 28, at 1590.
40. See Moohr, supra note 3, at 403 ("arbitrators neither create nor apply precedent.").
41. COOLEY, supra note 27, at 5.
42. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 201.
43. Moore, supra note 28, at 1591. The discrimination statutes reflect the public's interest in
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Employees generally stand to lose more than employers when they
"agree" to arbitrate future disputes." By agreeing to arbitrate, they are
waiving procedural rights and protections available in litigation. 5
Employees sacrifice their right to adjudicate claims in a federal court under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence by
an Article III judge." They may also lose their right to discovery and crossexamination." Finally, damage awards will likely be less than a jury would
award, and there is a reduced deterrent effect because the proceeding is

confidential. 8
Nonetheless, public policy generally encourages the use of arbitration as
a mechanism for relieving court congestion. 9 Consequently, both federal
and California courts are likely to interpret arbitration agreements in favor of
arbitration."0 In fact, the Armendariz court relied on this policy in holding
that mandatory employment arbitration agreements were enforceable."
However, this policy favoring arbitration developed in the context of
commercial and labor disputes. 2 Many have questioned whether this policy
is applicable to public laws enacted by Congress to protect our right to labor
in an environment free from discrimination and other workplace evils. 3

eliminating workplace discrimination. Moohr, supra note 3, at 399.
44. See Zack, supra note 19, at 67-68.
45. See id. In arbitration, employees may sacrifice their rights under Article I and Article III of
the Constitution, and under the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. Fitz, supra note 13, at
74.
46. Id. Likewise, they lose similar rights and protections that would be available in state courts
as well.
47. Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 12, at 1046.
48. Fitz, supra note 13, at 78.
49. See Norris Case, Arbitration of Workplace Discrimination Claims: Federal Law and
Compulsory Arbitration, 14 ToURo L. REV. 839, 863 (1998).
50. GOLDBERG, supra note 26, at 201; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 902 (Cal. 1992).
51. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 678-79 (Cal. 2000).
52. See BALES, supra note 7, at 19-20 (discussing labor), 23-26 (discussing commerce).
53. See Moohr, supra note 3, at 437-439; Matthew W. Finkin, Modern Manorial Law, INDUS.
REL., Apr. 1999, at 132-33. Examples of statutes designed to protect workers include Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (providing for damages where there has
been intentional discrimination); and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-19
(1994) (allowing employees to take leave for family and medical emergencies). State legislatures
have enacted statutes which parallel federal statutes, in addition to whistle-blower and other statutes
which provide even greater protection. See, e.g., Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (paralleling Title VII).
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The popularity of mandatory employment arbitration agreements
followed the United States Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of
employment arbitration in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., where it

held that a predispute agreement to arbitrate all employment related claims,
including statutory age discrimination claims, was enforceable."4 The Court
reasoned that the social policies reflected in the statute would not be
compromised by private resolution "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum."55 Although Gilmer did not involve an employment contract, many
lower courts, including the Armendariz court, interpret the decision broadly
and apply it to employment contracts.56 This section will outline the legal
support courts frequently rely on to enforce mandatory arbitration
agreements found in employment contracts.
A. The FederalArbitrationAct

Since the early colonial period, American business communities have
valued arbitration as a method of quickly resolving commercial disputes, and
for more than one hundred years have regularly included arbitration
provisions in standard form contracts. 7 Prior to the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), however, courts refused to enforce these
agreements.5" In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA,59 section 2 of which
requires courts to find arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce
and maritime transactions "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '
Courts could no longer refuse to enforce arbitration agreements, unless those
equitable and legal defenses available to challenge the validity

54. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
55. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
56. Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 33-34. Gilmer involved an individual's
arbitration agreement with the New York Stock Exchange, not his employer. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
25 n.2.
57. Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 35-37.
58. Id. at 37-38.
59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)). For a more detailed discussion of the FAA see BALES, supra note 7, at
1-59; Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8.
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

of a contract were also available to challenge the enforcement of a particular
arbitration agreement."
The Sixty-eighth Congress passed the FAA, expecting that it would
apply primarily to voluntary agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes.62
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court began expanding the use and significance

of the FAA in the context of commercial disputes, and by extension,
employment disputes as well.63 Finally, in 2001, the Supreme Court
definitively declared that the FAA does apply to employment disputes. '
The Court's modem progression to this most recent holding is
interesting. First, the Court adopted a policy favoring arbitration, meaning
that courts will enforce an arbitration agreement in borderline cases." Then
the Court held that the FAA applies in state courts, and that it preempts any
conflicting state law.66 The parties may, however, agree to be bound by state
law that differs from the FAA, so long as the state law does not undermine
the goals and policies of the FAA. 67 Consequently, any state law seeking to
restrict the use of arbitration will be preempted by the FAA. 68 Next, the
Court found the FAA applicable to a variety of statutory disputes, including
the federal age discrimination statute.' Finally, the Supreme Court held that
most employment contracts fall within the scope of the FAA's coverage."
61. Anderies, supra note 15, at 776.
62. See Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the
Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 400-01 &
n.16 (1998).
63. Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 1980s primarily concerned commercial disputes. See
BALES, supra note 7, at 23-25. Lower courts have extended the rationales underlying those decisions
to the employment setting. See id. at 49-59.
64. Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
65. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
66. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); Doctor's Assocs. Inc., v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1996).
67. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc., v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). This is true even when
following state law will require a different result. Harding, supra note 63, at 412.
68. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). In Doctor's Associates,
the Supreme Court found that the FAA preempted a Montana statute requiring that contracts
containing arbitration clauses provide notice of the commitment to arbitrate in typed underlined
capital letters at the bottom of the first page of the contract. Id. The state law was contrary to the
FAA's presumption of enforceability. Id. at 687. Furthermore, the FAA requires that arbitration
agreements be on "equal footing" with contracts, so states seeking to protect citizens from arbitration
clauses must do so under "generally applicable" contract defenses. Id.
69. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (ADEA); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust laws);
Shearson/American Exp. Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (RICO and 1933 Securities Act).
70. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). Section 2 provides an exclusion
for transportation workers, directly engaged in interstate commerce only. See id. at 1306.
Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that the § 2 exclusion applies to all employment contracts. Craft
v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (1998), rev'd, Circuit City Stores, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). All
other circuits applied the exclusion only to those directly engaged in interstate commerce. Dickstein
v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Erving v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064,
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In Circuit City v. Adams, a heavily divided Court forced the renegade
Ninth Circuit's alignment with the other eleven circuits regarding the FAA's
applicability to compulsory employment arbitration agreements. 7'

The

debate centered around section 1 and section 2 of the Act. Section 2 of the
FAA states that all arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce are
enforceable.72 Section 1 however, creates an exemption for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."73

Relying on canons of

statutory interpretation" rather than legislative or jurisprudential history,"
the Court rejected the view that section 1 excludes all contracts of
employment from coverage under the FAA.76 Instead, the Court held that

only those directly involved in the interstate movement of goods would be
excluded from coverage under the FAA. 7 Interestingly, the Court did note
that the Sixty-eighth Congress may have chosen alternative language for its

1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1997); O'Neil
v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87
F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cir.
1995); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50, 53 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576
(10th Cir. 1998); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 1998);
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
71. Circuit City, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001). This was a 5-4 decision. The majority Justices were
Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. The dissenting Justices were Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter.
72. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
73. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
74. Circuit City, 121 S. Ct. at 1308-09. The maxim ejusdem generis, directing that general
words following specific words should be construed to embrace terms similar to the specific terms,
led the Court to its conclusion. The general term "any other class of workers engaged in...
commerce" follows the specific enumeration of "seamen" and "railroad employees." According to
this canon, the exclusion for other workers engaged in commerce contemplates only those directly
involved in commerce, like seamen and railroad workers. Id.
75. The dissenting Justices focus on the Act's legislative history. Congress intended that the
FAA would apply to commercial and maritime contracts, not employment contracts. Id. at 1314-15
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, section 1 was included to appease labor organizations fearing
that federal courts might use the FAA to enforce arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Id. at
1315. The dissenters also note that at the time of enactment, Congress' commerce clause power
reached only employees "actually engaged in interstate commerce." Id. at 1320 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). By limiting the scope of the FAA so as to exclude from coverage all employment
contracts over which it had power to regulate, Congress illustrated its intent that the FAA should not
apply to any employment contracts. Id.
76. This was the construction adopted by the Ninth Circuit. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177
F.3d 1083 (9thCir. 1998).
77. Circuit City, 121 S.Ct. at 1311.
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legislation if it could have predicted that the Supreme Court's commerce
clause jurisprudence would lead to this construction."
B. The CaliforniaArbitrationAct

The California Arbitration Act ("CAA") is modeled after the FAA.79 It
also presumes an agreement is arbitrable, and enforces arbitration
agreements according to state contract law.80 In Moncharsh v. Heily &
Blase, the California Supreme Court noted that by enacting a comprehensive
scheme regulating private arbitration, the California legislature. has
expressed a "strong public policy in favor of arbitration."8' Thus, the courts
should "indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceedings."82
83
C. LaborArbitration

The Supreme Court recognizes that labor arbitration is essential for
maintaining industrial peace.' Accordingly, it encourages arbitration of
disputes regarding the interpretation and enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. " The courts are happy to defer to labor arbitrators
because they "have a special expertise in applying the 'law of the shop."'8 6
That is, labor arbitrators are often better qualified than judges to resolve
industrial disputes.87

Arbitrators do not have "special expertise. in interpreting the law of the
land," thus the Supreme Court has been more critical of allowing arbitrators

78. Id.
79. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 678-79 (Cal. 2000);
Anderies, supra note 15, at 777.
80. "A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy
thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1997); see also Anderies, supra
note 15, at 777 (citing Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 915 (Cal. 1997).
81. Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 902 (Cal. 1992).
82. Id.
83. Labor arbitration refers to arbitration involving collective bargaining agreements.
84. Moohr, supra note 3, at 406. Labor agrees not to strike in exchange for the promise to
arbitrate. Id.
85. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (requiring courts to
enforce promises to arbitrate); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) (holding that collective bargaining agreements were presumptively arbitrable); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding that arbitral awards are
enforceable with minimum judicial review). These three cases are collectively known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy. However, these cases are arbitrable under federal labor laws, not the FAA.
Moohr, supra note 3, at 405-406.
86. Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 12, at 1036. For a historical discussion of arbitrability of
union worker employment claims, see id. at 1022-1029.
87. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (finding arbitrators indispensable in collective bargaining
process because of their specialized knowledge).
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to resolve statutory claims.88

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the

Supreme Court held that an employee could not be required to arbitrate Title
VII claims, despite the presence of a mandatory arbitration clause in the
collective bargaining agreement.89 The Court gave four reasons illustrating
why arbitration was an inferior forum for the resolution of Title VII claims:
(1) the arbitrator is hired to serve "the intent of the parties rather than the
requirements of [the] legislation;" 9 (2) the comparatively lax fact finding
process in arbitration makes it a less appropriate forum than the federal
courts;9' (3) arbitrators do not have to issue written opinions; 2 and (4) the
union has exclusive control over the presentation of the individual's
statutory claim. 93 Following Gardner-Denver Co., most lower courts held
that antidiscrimination laws could not be the subject of a mandatory
arbitration agreement."
D. Arbitration of Statutory Claims

Until the 1980s, a "public policy defense" precluded a party from being
compelled to arbitrate any statutory claims under the FAA. In Wilko v.
Swan, the Supreme Court created the "public policy defense" when it
recognized that the judicial forum was superior to the arbitral forum for
resolving statutory claims, that compulsory arbitration violated public policy
because it constituted waiver of the statutory right to a judicial forum, and
that the informality of arbitration made it difficult for courts to correct errors
in statutory interpretation."
Thirty years later, after finding that the FAA creates a presumption in
favor of arbitrability,97 the Supreme Court reversed Wilko and laid the
"public policy defense" to rest through what has become known as the
88. See Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 12, at 1036 ("arbitrators may not be conversant with the
public law considerations underlying (statutory claims).") (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981)).
89. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
90. Id. at 56-57.
91. Id. at 57-58.
92. Id. at 58.
93. Id. at 58 n.19.
94. Stone, Employment Arbitration, supra note 8, at 49-5 1. This was true until 1991, when the
Court decided that a federal age discrimination statute claim could be the subject of compelled
arbitration. Spelfogel, supra note 4, at 79.
95. Stone, Employment Arbitration,supra note 8, at 49.
96. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1950), rev'd, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp.,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement with respect to claims
arising under the 1933 Securities Act).
97. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1953).

Mitsubishi Trilogy.98 The Mitsubishi Trilogy created a new presumption:

that statutory rights are arbitrable, unless the text and history of a particular
statute demonstrates Congress' intent to preclude enforcement of the statute
in arbitration.99 In announcing this presumption, the Court assumes that
arbitration does not require the waiver of any substantive rights,m and that
arbitrators are competent to resolve complex statutory issues.'"' Although
the Mitsubishi Trilogy allows courts to compel arbitration of statutory claims
arising from commercial disputes, it did not overrule Gardner-DenverCo.,
or its suggestion that Title VII claims cannot be the subject of a compelled
arbitration. 02
E. Arbitrability of Statutory Employment DiscriminationClaims
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.
Pursuant to an agreement with the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), the Supreme Court compelled Robert Gilmer to arbitrate his Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claims with his employer,
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.' 3 The Court reconsidered its distrust
of the arbitral forum expressed in Gardner-Denverin light of its recently
discovered presumption in favor of arbitration.'" As required by Mitsubishi,
98. The Supreme Court found statutory claims were arbitrable under the FAA in Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (Sherman Antitrust Act);
Shearson/American Exp. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (1934 Securities and Exchange Act
and RICO); Rodriguez de Quijaas v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (1933
Securities Act).
99. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626.
100. Id. at 628.
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
Id.
101. The parties can select an arbitrator with statutory expertise, and may also employ experts to
assist. "[W]e are Well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution." Id. at 626-27.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 86-94.
103. Id.
104. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("liberal federal policy favoring arbitration");
Mitsubishi Trilogy, supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing arbitrability of statutory
claims)). The Court relied on the recently decided commercial arbitration cases rather than
Gardner-Denver to find the ADEA claims arbitrable. Moohr, supra note 3, at 415-416. The Court
suggests that the arbitrability of statutory claims will depend upon whether the employee is
represented by a union or not. See generally, John E. Taylor, Note, Helping Those Who Help
Themselves: The Fourth Circuit's Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 79
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Gilmer would have to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude
arbitration of ADEA claims to overcome the presumption of arbitrability.' 5
Gilmer failed to meet this burden, and the Court concluded that the arbitral
forum was adequate to both address individual grievances, and to further the
social policy goals of the ADEA (to prohibit age discrimination).'
Despite Gilmer's protest, the Court found that he could effectively
vindicate his statutory rights in an arbitration. 7 Gilmer's concerns
regarding biased arbitrators,' 8 limited discovery,'" the lack of written
opinions, ' ° and equitable relief' were characterized as "far out of step with
[the Court's] current strong endorsement" of arbitration."2 In any event,
Gilmer's concerns were adequately protected by NYSE arbitration rules."3
However, the Court did not require that NYSE-like safeguards be present
whenever statutory rights are being vindicated, leaving future employees
vulnerable to arbitrations with far fewer procedural protections."'
Strictly speaking, Gilmer only requires the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in non-employment contracts entered into as a condition of
employment, and only compels arbitration of ADEA claims."5 It does not
necessarily apply to employment contracts or other antidiscrimination

claims. This leaves room for courts to find that employees should not be

N.C. L. REV. 239 (2000) (comparing union and individual arbitration agreements).
105. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
106. Id. at 26-28.
107. Id. at 30-32.
108. Id. at 30. The Court said the parties were free to select impartial arbitrators. Id.
Furthermore, the NYSE rules allowed employees to inquire into the arbitrators ability to render an
impartial decision, and allowed them one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.
Id.
109. Id. at 31. Limited discovery is sufficient for ADEA claims. Id. Furthermore, NYSE rules
provided for document production, deposition, subpoenas, and information requests. Id.
110. Id. at 31-32 Gilmer argued that the lack of written opinions would prevent the public from
knowing of an employer's discriminatory practices, render appellate review ineffective, and stifle the
development of law. Id. The Court responded that courts would continue to hear a sufficient
number of ADEA claims to address his concerns. Id. Furthermore, NYSE arbitration decisions are
written and available to the public. Id.
111. Id. Arbitrators can fashion equitable relief, and the EEOC is not precluded from seeking
equitable and class-wide relief. Id.
112. Id. at 30.
113. id. at 30-32.
114. However, the Court did suggest that minimum safeguards must be present. See id. at 33
("claimed procedural inadequacies ...[are] best left for resolution in specific cases."). Lower
courts, including Armendariz, have enumerated minimum procedural safeguards required for the
arbitration of statutory claims. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
115. BALES, supra note 7, at 49.

compelled 6to arbitrate
7 Title VII and Fair Employment and Housing Act
("FEHA")' claims.'
2. Title VII and Parallel State Statutes

8

Following Gilmer, it seems that an employee will be compelled to

arbitrate Title VII claims unless she can demonstrate that Congress intended
to preclude arbitration of the statutory rights at issue."9 This intention would
be discoverable in the text or legislative history of the statute, or through an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose.
Ambiguity best describes
Congress' intent with respect to the arbitration of
2
Title VII claims.1 1
Title VII seeks to promote equality of employment opportunities by
outlawing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'22 Although federal courts are ultimately responsible for the
enforcement of Title VII, 23 Congress has recognized that alternative forms
of dispute resolution might play a role in enforcing the federal
discrimination laws.'24 Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides
that "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative

means of dispute resolution, including..,

arbitration, is

encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by. this title."" -*While most courts have interpreted
this as a reflection of Congress' intent to encourage even mandatory
arbitration,"' commentators and the Ninth Circuit understand section 118 as

an endorsement of only voluntary arbitration.'27

116. The FEHA is California's version of Title VII. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12990-12996 (West
1992 & Supp. 2000).
117. See BALES, supra note 7, at 49. However, only the Ninth Circuit has refused to apply Gilmer
to Title VII and FEHA cases. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188-89
(1998).
118. California's parallel statute, the Fair Employment and Housing Act is "explicitly made part
of the Title VII enforcement scheme." Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,477 (1982).
119. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
120. Id.
121. Ellwood F. Oakley, III & Donald 0. Mayer, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism,47 S.C. L. REV. 475, 489-90 (1996).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994).
123. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
124. Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of DiscriminationClaims and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991: Encouragedor Proscribed?44 WAYNE L. REV. 1619, 1620 (1999) (citing Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081, reprintedin notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
125. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, reprintedin notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
126. See Ryan D. O'Dell, Does Title VII Preclude Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration
Agreements? The Ninth CircuitSays Yes., 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 94 (1999).
127. See, e.g., id.; Adams, supra note 125; Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182,
1193 (9th Cir. 1998). Arbitration cannot honor the public interest in enforcing Title VII. Id. at
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In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit held that

compulsory arbitration of Title VII and FEHA claims were not "appropriate"
within the terms of section 118, and that compulsory arbitration agreements
were not "authorized by law" when Congress drafted section 118. 28' Duffield
reasoned that the term "where appropriate" must be considered in the
context of the statute's purpose, which is to strengthen employee rights.'
The Act sought to give employees flexibility in choosing a forum for
resolving employment discrimination claims, not limit them to one nonjudicial option imposed by the alleged civil rights violator.'3 ° Thus,
agreements that make arbitration compulsory are not appropriate alternative
forums.
The Duffield court went on to interpret the phrase "to the extent
authorized by law."' 3 ' In doing so, the court considered the law as Congress

understood it when section 118 was drafted.'3 2 After reviewing legislative

history, the court concluded that Congress intended to codify GardnerDenver's rule prohibiting enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute agreements

1188. The Ninth Circuit is the renegade circuit with respect to this view. Every other court to
consider the issue has found that employees can be compelled to arbitrate statutory claims. See, e.g.,
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title VII and state law claims);
Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (Title VII claims); McWilliams v.
Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998) (ADA claim); Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs,, 105 F.3d
1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Title VII claim); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir.
1995) (ADEA claims); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (state law
sex discrimination claim). State courts have also rejected Duffield's view. See e.g., Rembert v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); DeCaminada v. Coopers
& Lybrand, L.L.P., 591 N.W.2d 364 (Mich. App. 1998); Alamo Rent A Car, Inc., v. Galarza, 703
A.2d 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Gunby v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United
States., 971 S.W.2d 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Freeman v. Minolta Bus. Sys., Inc., 699 So. 2d 1182
(La. Ct. App. 1997); Gaffney v. Powell, 668 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
128. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194-1200. Nor does the court believe they were authorized when the
statute was passed because Congress intended to codify Gardner-Denver,not Gilmer. Id. at 119495. "Where appropriate" limits what is "authorized by law," so even if the Act is interpreted to
codify Gilmer's finding that compulsory arbitration may be authorized by law, it isnot appropriate
with respect to Title VII claims. Id. at 1198.
129. Id. at 1194.
130. Id.; see also Adams, supra note 125, at 1639.
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking
to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced
discrimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal
courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had
long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the
chickens.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Duffield, 144F.3dat 1194.
132. Id.
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to arbitrate Title VII claims. 3 ' Among other things, the court cited
committee findings that all circuit courts prohibit compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims,"' the President's statement that "'section 118 encourages

voluntary agreements,"' 35 and congressional rejection of a Republican
proposal that would have allowed the use of arbitration as a substitute for
judicial resolution.'36
Other courts have reviewed the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, and concluded it does not preclude compulsory arbitration of
Title VII claims.'37 These courts often rely on the plain meaning of the
statute, which on its face, seems to encourage arbitration.'38 Of particular
importance to these courts is the fact that the 1991 Act, passed six months
after Gilmer, established that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims was
acceptable, thus suggesting that Congress intended to codify Gilmer. 9
F. The Treatment of ArbitrationAgreements in CaliforniaState Courts
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, California state courts will enforce mandatory
employment arbitration agreements reaching statutory claims, provided that
the Armendariz requirements are satisfied.'4 ° However, these agreements
will be struck down if they are found to be procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.'' If the contract or a provision of the contract is not within
the reasonable expectations of the adhering party, or the contract is unduly
oppressive, the agreement will be unconscionable and unenforceable. "2

133. "The legislative history of the Act makes it absolutely clear that Congress intended § 118 to
codify the Gardner-Denver approach to compulsory arbitration agreements and to preclude the
enforceability of such agreements with respect to Title VII claims." Id. at 1198. Committees did not
even discuss Gilmer. See Oakely & Mayer, supra note 122, at 489.
134. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194.
135. Id. at 1197.
136. Id. at 1196.
137. See cases cited supra note 128; Oakely & Mayer, supra note 122, at 489-92 (discussing
legislative history).
138. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, reprinted in notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994)
("[A]lternative means of dispute resolution ... is encouraged."). Anderies, supra note 15, at 775
(citing Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d at 182).
139. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 677-78 (Cal. 2000).
140. See infra Part IV.B.3a-e.
141. See Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1329-32 (1999).
142. Id. at 1328.
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IV.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

A. Facts of the Case

In the summer of 1995, Foundation Health Services, Inc. hired
Marybeth Armendariz and Dolores Olague-Rodgers into the "Provider
Relations Group."'' 3 They were subsequently promoted to supervisory
positions, but less than a year later those positions were eliminated and
Armendariz and Olague-Rodgers were fired.'" The employees claimed they
were wrongfully terminated because of their "perceived and/or actual sexual
orientation (heterosexual)."'' 5 Accordingly, they filed a complaint for
wrongful termination, alleging that their supervisors and co-workers had
in violation
subjected them to sexually based harassment and discrimination,
46
("FEHA").1
Act
Housing
and
Employment
of the Fair
Their employment application forms included an arbitration clause
47
pertaining to future claims arising out of the employment relationship.'
The clause mandated that employees (1) arbitrate all disputes arising out of
the employment; (2) submit to arbitration under the CAA; 4 8 and (3) limit
their claims for damages to lost wages up to the date of the arbitration
award. 141

143. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 674.
144. Id. at 674-75.
145. Id. at 675. Employees claimed that their supervisor was gay and discriminated against them
because they were heterosexual. Resp't Brief at 11, Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (No. S075942).
146. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675. Employees also alleged wrongful termination causes of action
based on tort and contract theories of recovery. Id.
147. Id. The text of the arbitration clause stated that:
I agree as a condition of my employment, that in the event my employment is terminated,
and I contend that such termination was wrongful . . . I and Employer agree to submit
any such matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of title 9 of Part III of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, commencing at section 1280 et seq. or any
successor or replacement statutes. I and Employer further expressly agree that in any
such arbitration, my exclusive remedies for violation of the terms, conditions or
covenants of employment shall be limited to a sum equal to the wages I would have
earned from the date of any discharge until the date of the arbitration award. I understand
that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at law or in equity, including but not
limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief.
Id. They subsequently executed another agreement containing this same clause. Id.
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
149. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675; see also supra note 148 (setting forth the text of the arbitration
agreement).
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Relying on the arbitration agreement, Foundation Health filed a motion
to compel arbitration.'50 The trial court held the arbitration agreement was
unfair and therefore unenforceable. 5
It specifically noted that the
agreement lacked mutuality in that only employees were required to arbitrate
claims (employers were free to seek judicial resolution of any claims it may
have against employees), it did not provide for adequate discovery, and the
limitation on damages precluded recovery under the FEHA, as well as
contract and torts causes of action.'5 2
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the agreement was
enforceable, minus the unconscionable remedy provision.' 3 The Court of
Appeal5 also found that employees were afforded adequate discovery by the
CAA.' 4
The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision,
concluding that the agreement was unenforceable because it was permeated
with unconscionability.'5
Although the court found this particular
mandatory employment arbitration agreement unenforceable, it did hold that
other such agreements will be enforced in the future if they permit
employees to vindicate their statutory rights.'56
B. Court's Analysis

1. Arbitrability of statutory antidiscrimination claims
The court begins its analysis by concluding that statutory
antidiscrimination claims, the FEHA specifically, can be the subject of a
mandatory arbitration agreement.'57 This is contrary to current precedent in
the Ninth Circuit evidenced by its decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens
& Co.' 5 The Armendariz court thoughtfully considered and categorically

150. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675.
151. Id. It found the arbitration provision to be "so one-sided as to shock the conscience." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
152. Id.
153. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 (Ct. App. 1998).
154. Id. at 267. The arbitration agreement incorporated the CAA, which provides that:
[T]he parties to the arbitration shall have the right to take depositions and to obtain
discovery regarding the subject matter of the arbitration, and, to that end, to use and
exercise all of the same rights, remedies, and procedures ... as if the subject matter of the
arbitration were pending in a civil action before a superior court of this state ....
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.05(a) (West 1997).
155. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 699.
156. Id. at 674.
157. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675-78. The court would find Title VII claims equally arbitrable. Id.
at 678.
158. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (prohibiting the
enforcement of mandatory employment agreements to arbitrate Title VII or equivalent state
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rejected the Ninth Circuit's view that employees cannot be compelled to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims..59
The holding in Duffield is based on what the Armendariz court would

call a peculiar interpretation of section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
which provides that "[wihere appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including...
arbitration, is encouraged."' While most courts have interpreted this as a
reflection of Congress' intent to encourage arbitration,'6 ' the Duffield court

understood it to be "indicative of a congressional intent to outlaw
compulsory arbitration of employee civil rights claims."''
The Armendariz court reasoned that if Congress intended to "ban
mandatory employment arbitration by means of a clause that encourages the

use of arbitration," it could have explicitly "proscribed mandatory
employment arbitration of Title VII claims."'63 Furthermore, Duffield
mistakenly believes that compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims was
illegal when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was drafted, leading it to a flawed
analysis of "to the extent authorized by law."'" 4 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 was passed six months after the Supreme Court decided in Gilmer that
an employee could be compelled to arbitrate ADEA claims.'65 The
Armendariz court assumes that Gilmer applies to employment contracts, and
concludes that because Gilmer was the law when the Civil Rights Act of
1991 was passed, Congress was aware of Gilmer when it used the phrase "to
the extent authorized by law. ' ' "M
Unlike Duffield, the Armendariz court found "nothing in the [Civil
Rights Act of 19911 prohibit[ing] mandatory employment arbitration

antidiscrimination claims). See supra text accompanying notes 125-134.
159. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 675-78.
160. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, reprinted in notes following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
161. See supra note 128.
162. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 676 (citing Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191).
163. Id. at 677.
164. Id.
165. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Gilmer Court did not hold
that Title VII claims are arbitrable. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 677. In any event, the law did not clearly
prohibit the arbitration of Title Vn claims when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted, as the
Duffield court states. Id. at 677-78.
166. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 678. See Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 12, at 1033 (citing the
following cases that apply Gilmer to Title VII suits: Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Albert v. NCR, 874 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Scott v.
Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank,
807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.
1995)).
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agreements that encompass state and federal antidiscrimination claims."'67
The next step for the court was to examine the applicability of the FAA and
the CAA to the arbitration agreement in dispute.'68
2. Applicability of The FAA and The CAA
The court observes that the FAA "incorporates a strong federal policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements, including agreements to arbitrate statutory
rights," but declines to apply the FAA to this dispute. 69 Recognizing that the
United States Supreme Court may find employment contracts unenforceable
under the FAA,1 0 the court opts to analyze the agreement under the CAA.'7'
Unlike the FAA, the CAA does not provide an exclusion for any
employment contracts.' 2
In fact, the CAA specifically applies to
"agreements between employers and employees."' 73 The court states that it
can apply California's state statute without being preempted by the FAA in
this situation, because it is consistent with the federal policy favoring
arbitration. '74

So long as the employment arbitration agreement does not contemplate
arbitration of a statutory claim that the legislature did not intend to be

arbitrated, the agreement can be enforced under the CAA.'75 The court finds
that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the arbitration of FEHA
claims, 76 and concludes that the arbitral forum can adequately protect the
employees' statutory rights.'

167. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 678.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. At the time Armendariz was decided, the Supreme Court had not issued its decision in
Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001) (holding that the FAA does apply to
employment contracts).
171. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679-80. Like the FAA, the CAA finds arbitration agreements "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1997).
172. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679 n.5 (noting that former exemption for labor contracts has been
repealed).
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280(a) (West 1997).
174. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679. If the CAA restricted the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, it would be preempted. Id. (citing Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687-88 (1996)); see also supra note 69, and accompanying text.
175. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679.
176. Id.
177. Id. "'[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum."' Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
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3. Arbitration of statutory antidiscrimination claims
An employer cannot curtail or require employees to waive FEHA
claims.'78 It is a violation of public policy for an employer to avoid
responsibility for his or her violations of law by contract. 9 Furthermore, a
person cannot waive public laws such as the FEHA, because the statute aims
to protect the public at large from discrimination in the workplace.'80 Thus,
the Armendariz court held that if FEHA claims are arbitrated, they must
provide claimants with an adequate forum for vindicating statutory rights.'8'
The court engages in an extensive analysis of Cole v. Burn Int'l Sec.

Serv.,' 2 in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal formulated five minimum
requirements for the compelled arbitration of nonwaivable Title VII claims
as a condition of employment.'83 The Cole court requires that the arbitration
agreement provide for: (1) neutral arbitrators; (2) more than minimal
discovery; (3) a written award; (4) all types of relief that would be available
in court; and (5) only minimal fees to access the arbitral forum.'

Ultimately, the Armendariz court examines and adopts these provisions as

minimum

requirements

for

mandatory

employment

arbitrations

in

California.'

178. Id. at 680-81.
179. Id. at 681 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 1985)).
180. Id. 680-81 (citing In re Marriage of Fell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 526 (1997)). The FEHA is a
reflection of California's public policy against employment discrimination. See id.
181. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 681. These problems do not arise when the arbitration contemplates
contractual rights, for example under collective bargaining agreements. Contractual rights are
created by the parties. Statutory rights, on the other hand, are created by Congress. They are public
laws, entitled to the rights and protections provided by the law; parties cannot agree to modify
statutory rights. Id. (citing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)). Several other jurisdictions have
found compelled arbitration of statutory claims acceptable. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 128.
182. 105 F.3d 1465.
183. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682.
184. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482
185. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682-89. The court does note that these minimum safeguards are not
required where employer and employee freely negotiate an arbitration agreement. Armendariz, 6
P.3d at 682 n.8. These requirements attach where the arbitration forum is imposed on an employee,
to ensure that the agreement is not used to curtail FEHA rights. Id.

a. Neutrality of the arbitrator
In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,156 the California Supreme Court held

that a neutral arbitrator is essential for the integrity of the arbitration
system."'
b. Limitation of remedies

Armendariz also held that employees cannot be compelled to arbitrate
statutory claims unless the full range of statutory remedies is made available
to them.188 The agreement in Armendariz unlawfully limited employee
remedies to backpay.' 9 A judicial forum would have provided employees
the opportunity to recover punitive damages and attorney fees for their
FEHA claims. 9 ° The court concluded this provision limiting damages was
contrary to public policy, hence arbitration was an inadequate forum for the
vindication of the employees' statutory rights.''
c. Adequate discovery

Employees often do not have access to the information they need to
vindicate their statutory rights.'92 Employers generally have relevant
documents and employees under their control.'93 Without access to such

documents, employees may be unable to present their discrimination case.'94
Armendariz recognized this, and held that when an employer agrees to
arbitrate FEHA claims, the employer impliedly consents to discovery
sufficient for employees to vindicate their FEHA claims.' 5 The court leaves
the determination of what constitutes "adequate discovery" up to the

186. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
187. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
188. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682-83.
189. Id. The arbitration clause expressly provided that "my exclusive remedies.., shall be
limited to a sum equal to the wages I would have earned from the date of any discharge until the date
of the arbitration award. I understand that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at law or in
equity." Id.
190. Id. at 683 (citing Commodore Home Sys. Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 649 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1982); (CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12965(b)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 683.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 683-84.
195. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684 (citing Dunlop Report, supra note 31).
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arbitrator, stating only that employees must have access to "essential
documents and witnesses.'

96

The court warns employers that the CAA's discovery provisions may be
inadequate for statutory discrimination claims.'97 The CAA guarantees
discovery equivalent to that available in a superior court for disputes arising
out of injury or death caused by wrongful or negligent acts. 98 Arguably,
employment discrimination claims do not fall within this category of
disputes, in which case the statutory right to discovery, would not attach.'99
The court also notes that an employee may be able to adequately vindicate
her FEHA rights with less discovery than provided for under the CAA.'l
The court concludes that employees are simply entitled to whatever

discovery is "sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim." ''
d. Written arbitrationaward andjudicialreview

To facilitate judicial review, the court held that "an arbitrator in an
FEHA case must issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal,
however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award
is based."" ° Although arbitration awards are generally not reviewable,"'
where statutory rights are involved limited review is necessary to ensure that

the arbitrator does not disregard the law.2' However, the court refused to
articulate what this standard of review will be.205
e. Employee Not to Pay UnreasonableForum Costs

The court further held that a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement encompassing FEHA claims "impliedly obliges the employer to
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.05; 1283.1).
198. Id. at 683-84 n. 19 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3(a)).
199. Id. at 684 & n.10 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1283.05).
200. See id. at 684.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 685. The CAA does not require a written arbitration decision. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1283.4 (West 1997); Baldwin Co. v. Rainey Constr. Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 499 n.3 (1991).
203. "[A]n arbitration award may not be vacated for errors of law on the face of the decision, even
if these errors would cause substantial injustice." Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684 (citing Moncharsh v.
Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992)).
204. Id. at 685 (citing Shearson/American Exp. Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987);
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Round Valley Teachers
Ass'n., 914 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1996)). If the arbitrator is allowed to disregard the law, arbitration is not
an adequate forum for vindicating FEHA claims. Id. at 684-85.
205. Id. at 685.
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pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration."'2

Relying heavily on

Cole, the court found that if employees had to pay the often substantial costs

and fees associated with arbitration, many would find themselves financially
unable to pursue their statutory claims."° Because the employer has
mandated that claims be resolved through arbitration, the court concluded
that the employer must also bear any costs over and above what the

employee would be responsible for if he or she were free to bring the action
in court. 2' Otherwise, the costs of arbitration may deter employees from
bringing discrimination claims, thereby undermining the public policy goals
of the FEHA' 9
The court was very clear that with respect to fee sharing, the CAA's
default position directing each party to pay its pro rata share of costs would
not apply where statutory claims are involved."0 Any arrangement which
imposes substantial forum fees on employees violates public policy, and is
cause for invalidating an arbitration agreement."' The legislature did not
intend that an employee would pay for what is the "equivalent of [a] judge's
time and the rental of [a] courtroom" in order to resolve antidiscrimination
claims."'
Accordingly, the court construes the FEHA as implicitly
prohibiting such costs.213
The court rejected arguments that an arbitrator might be biased towards

the employer simply because the employer is paying her. It is more likely
instead, that the employer will enjoy favorable treatment as a "repeat player"
in the arbitration system; but the court is not concerned, because it expects
that institutional safeguards, such as the plaintiffs bar, will protect against
corrupt arbitrators."'

206. Id. at 689. The court cites Cole, which reported arbitration fees could range from $500 to
$1,000 per day; Shankle, which reported arbitration would cost the employee between $1,875 to
$5,000; and Rosenberg, which reported forum fees could be as high as $3,000 per day. Id. at 68687. Many employees, those that have been terminated in particular cannot afford these fees. This
holding is in conflict with the CAA, which directs each party to pay its pro rata share of arbitration
expenses. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1284.2 (West 1997).
207. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685-86 (quoting Cole, citing Gilmer). Costs unique to arbitration may
include arbitrator time, room rental, and court reporter fees. Id. at 685-87.
208. Id. at 688.
[U]nder Gilmer, arbitration is supposed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum.
Therefore, it would undermine Congress's intent to prevent employees who are seeking
to vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to a judicial forum and then require them
to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they would never be required to pay for a
judge in court.
Id. at 685 (quoting Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484).
209. Id. at 688.
210. Id. (discussing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.2 (West 1997)).
211. Id. at 688-89.
212. Id. at 688.
213. Id. at 689.
214. Id. at 687-88. But see Taylor, supra note 105, at 302 (pointing out that empirical research
demonstrates that "repeat player" employers are more successful than "one shot player" employees,
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4. Unconscionability of the Arbitration Agreement
The court registers some concern that mandatory employment
arbitration agreements have the potential to be used as "instrument[s] of
injustice imposed on a 'take it or leave it' basis."2 '5 To combat this unjust
116
use, the court will refuse to enforce unconscionable arbitration agreements.
The court will find an unconscionable arbitration agreement in a contract of
adhesion2 7 with provisions not within the "reasonable expectations" of the
adhering party, that are also "unduly oppressive."2 '8 The court may sever
unconscionable provisions of a contract, or the entire agreement may be
invalidated 2

9

The court in Armendariz quickly found that the arbitration agreement
was adhesive, because it was non-negotiable and mandated as a condition of

Like most employees, Armendariz and Olague-Rodgers
employment."2
were economically unable to refuse the arbitration agreement, because that
The
would have been tantamount to declining the offer of employment.'
agreement was also unconscionable because it was lacking in mutuality and
limited the remedies available to employees.2
The arbitration agreement lacked mutuality because only employees
were required to arbitrate claims, while the employer remained free to
adjudicate any claims it might have against employees.2 3 Thus, employees
were required to waive significant benefits available in a judicial forum
presumably because they have more experience with arbitration, and because a business relationship
develops between the arbitrator and the employer).
215. Arnendariz, 6 P.3d at 690-91 (quoting Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d
903, 915 (Cal. 1997).
216. Id. at 689-90.
217. "[A] standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it."
Id. at 689 (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961)).
218. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. Although the agreement must feature elements of both
procedural and substantive unconscionably, they "need not be present in the same degree." Id. at
690.
219. Id. at 689.
220. Id. at 690.
221. Id. (the court noted "few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration
requirement.").
222. Id. at 691. Employees were precluded from recovering punitive damages and damages for
future earnings. Id. at 694. Remedies available to the employer were not restricted. Id.
223. Id. California appellate courts had previously held that arbitration agreements lacking in
mutuality would be found unconscionable. See Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138
(1997); Kinney v. United HealthCare Serv., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1999) (finding such
agreements unconscionable because the employee relinquishes the right to judicial review and the
rights guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, including the right to a jury trial, while the
employer maintains those rights).

while employers retained access to those benefits."' Unless legitimate
"business realit[ies]" justify this lack of mutuality, such agreements are
unconscionable.2"
Otherwise, arbitration might become a tool for
maximizing employer advantage, rather than a neutral forum for resolving
disputes.

6

The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was "permeated by
an unlawful purpose" because it contained two unlawful provisions.2"
Furthermore, short of reforming the contract, there is nothing the court could
do to remove the unconscionable taint caused by the agreement's lack of
mutuality.228 Thus, it was appropriate to void the entire agreement rather
than sever the unlawful provisions."'
C. Concurring Opinion

The concurrence takes issue with the majority's "simplistic" approach of
imposing all arbitral costs on the employer. 3 Justice Brown first points out
that "'arbitration is often far more affordable to plaintiffs and defendants
alike than pursuing a claim in court,"' suggesting that arbitral costs might
not deter employees from exercising statutory rights."' Furthermore, not all
arbitrations are expensive, and "not all employees are unable to afford the
unique costs of arbitration." ' So long as the employee is not required to
front the arbitration costs, Justice Brown would rather leave the issue of
apportionment to the arbitrator.233 In apportioning costs, the arbitrator should
"consider the magnitude of the costs unique to arbitration, the ability of the
employee to pay a share of these costs, and the overall expense of the
2 34
arbitration as compared to a court proceeding.

224. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691-92.. For example, the right to a jury and judicial review. Id. at
691.
225. Id. at 691-92 (quoting Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d at 148).
226. Id. at 692..
227. Id. at 697. (citing Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir.
1994)). There was an unlawful damages provision, and the agreement was unconscionably
unilateral.
228. Id. at 695-96 (explaining that courts are not allowed to reform contracts).
229. Id. at 696-97.
230. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 699 (Brown, J., concurring). "Simplicity, however, is not a proxy for
correctness." Id. The majority would have employer pay all costs unique to arbitration, if
arbitration is mandatory. See supra Part V.B.3.e.
231. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 699 (quoting Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999).
232. d. (citing Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 763-65 (5th Cir. 1999)
(compelling arbitration because employee did not demonstrate that he could not afford arbitration, or
that its cost would deter him from exercising statutory rights).
233. Id. at 700. Any problems with the arbitrator's determination could be resolved by judicial
review. Id.
234. Id.
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V.

IMPACT

A. Provides Guidance

Armendariz allows employers to avoid employment litigation. It
instructs employers on how to structure enforceable predispute employment
arbitration agreements. 35 These agreements will be upheld so long as they
provide for a fair arbitration.236 The arbitration will be considered fair if the
Armendariz safeguards are satisfied.237 The employer must agree to pay all
costs unique to the arbitration, so that the prospective cost of arbitration will
not deter employees from vindicating their statutory rights.23 The employer
must also ensure that the arbitration will be presided over by a neutral
arbitrator. 39 This neutral arbitrator must draft a written award explaining her
decision in sufficient detail, such that a reviewing judge can ensure that the
employees statutory rights have been protected." ' Those rights include
access to the full range of remedies that would be available in a judicial
forum, including attorney's fees and punitive damages.'
The employee
must also be afforded the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery, so that
she can present a solid case.2 Finally, the arbitration agreement must be
mutual and bind both the employer and the employee. 3 The court also
informed employers that the CAA does not adequately protect statutory
rights, because it does not require a written award,2" may not entitle
employees to adequate discovery," 5 and may require employees to pay
substantial forum fees. 6
Noticeably absent from the court's recipe for a fair arbitration is the
requirement that the compelled arbitration be pursuant to a clear and

235. Employers must ensure employees their Armendariz rights, see supra Part IV.B.3, and ensure
that both parties are equally bound by the arbitration agreement. See supra text accompanying notes
221-23.
236. Similar requirements have been described as fairness provisions. See, e.g,. Stone, Yellow
Dog, supra note 12, at 1045.
237. See supra Part 1V.B.3.
238. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685-89.
239. Id. at 682.
240. Id. at 684-85.
241. Id. at682-83.
242. Id. at 683-84.
243. Id. at 690-94.
244. Id. at 685.
245. Id. at 684.
246. Id. at 688.

unmistakable waiver of the right to adjudicate, and the employee's right to
representation.
The absence of a "clear and unmistakable" waiver
requirement means that an employee who signs an arbitration agreement,
without understanding the ramifications of her consent, may be required to
arbitrate discrimination claims she never imagined could be arbitrable. 47
And, she may be required to do so without the aid of an attorney.2 8
Though a step in the right direction, it is questionable whether the
Armendariz safeguards will be enough to transform arbitration into an
adequate forum for the resolution of statutory rights. Certainly, arbitration
can provide redress for an injury suffered as a result of discrimination.149
However, it is far from certain whether arbitration can also further the public
policy goals behind the statutes.2 "° As the enforcement of statutory
employment discrimination claims moves into the private realm of
arbitration, arbitrators will find no precedent to follow in deciding cases, and
will also create no precedent to guide others.2 ' This could lead to
inconsistent interpretation and application of the statutes.
B. Expense to employer
Armendariz makes arbitration fair at the employer's expense, most
significantly because it requires employers to pay all costs and fees beyond
that of a judicial forum.253 The Armendariz promise of "adequate discovery"
also comes at the employer's expense.54 If adequate discovery means more
discovery (which it probably does), it will prolong the life of arbitration,
requiring more of the arbitrator's time, which translates into increased costs
for the employer. 5
The fiscal impact of the judicial review element of Armendariz is
difficult to predict, as we do not know the standard of review for arbitral
decisions. 256 We do at least know that it makes arbitration decisions less
final, and will probably require the arbitrator to take more time to write a
247. Cf Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80781 (1998) (requiring "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of statutory claims pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement); see also
Taylor, supra note 105, at 282-96 (arguing that a "clear and unmistakable" waiver should be
extended to individual arbitration agreements).
248. Scholars and government agencies generally agree that employees should have the right to be
represented by counsel when required to arbitrate statutory claims. Id. at 303 (citing the Dunlop
Report and the Due Process Protocol,supra note 19).
249. Moohr, supra note 3, at 418.
250. Id.
251. Stone, Yellow Dog, supra note 12, at 1042.
252. Id.
253. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000).
254. See id. at 683-84,
255. See Moohr, supra note 3, at 401 (stating that judicial review necessarily increases the cost of
arbitration).
256. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 685.
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well-reasoned decision for the reviewing court." Also, the employer will
probably want to provide a detailed record of the arbitration for the
reviewing court, which means the additional expense of a court reporter to
prepare a transcript of the proceedings."' All of these costs will be borne by
the employer alone. In light of this, employers will need to perform a new
"cost/benefit calculus and decide whether arbitration" continues to be "the
most economical forum. 25 9
C. Forum Shopping

The United States Supreme Court has said, "Congress would not have
wanted state and federal courts to reach different outcomes about the validity
of arbitration in similar cases." 2

But the Ninth Circuit and the California

Supreme Court have reached contrary conclusions regarding the validity of
compulsory Title VII/FEHA arbitration.16' Because the courts interpret the

Civil Rights Act of 1991 differently, parties can be compelled to arbitrate
claims in a California superior court that they would not be compelled to
arbitrate in a California district court.262 Consequently, employees with
statutory claims hoping to avoid enforcement of arbitration agreements will
prefer to file claims in federal court, where judges are more likely to
interpret the law in a manner which is consistent with their position. Until
Congress or the United States Supreme Court steps in, this will encourage
forum shopping.M
The Ninth Circuit, under Duffield, will not uphold any mandatory
employment agreement to arbitrate Title VII or FEHA claims.16' The
California Supreme Court, on the other hand, has said such claims are
257. See id.
258. Moohr, supra note 3, at 454.
259. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 688.
260. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
261. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that such
agreements are invalid); Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 677-78 (holding that such agreements are valid).
262. Id. (holding that the Act encourages arbitration of statutory claims); Duffield, 144 F.3d at
1199 (holding that the Act proscribes arbitration of statutory claims).
263. Parties can bring FEHA claims in federal court with diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1081 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (using diversity jurisdiction
to litigate state FEHA claims in federal court). Otherwise parties can acquire federal question
jurisdiction by appending FEHA claims to Title VII claims. See, e.g, Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d
1211, 1230 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing pendent jurisdiction for FEHA claims).
264. "'Forum shopping' typically refers to the act of seeking the most advantageous venue in
which to try a case." Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at
Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 79 (1999).

265. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185, 1187 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998).
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arbitrable.2" Although the California Supreme Court should be the final
authority on state law issues,267 the Ninth Circuit has suggested that it will
not yield to the state rule regarding the arbitrability of FEHA claims.26
Despite Armendariz, the Ninth Circuit will probably refuse to compel
arbitration of FEHA claims, because the FEHA is "explicitly made part of
Title VII's enforcement scheme," and is therefore arbitrable only to the
extent that Title VII claims are arbitrable. 69 The bottom line is that the same
exact case, arising out of identical facts, will be resolved differently
depending on whether the case is before a state or federal court.
D. Threats to mandatory employment arbitrationagreements

1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
Congress created the EEOC to interpret and enforce federal employment
27
discrimination laws designed to ensure equal opportunity in employment.
In a 1997 Policy Statement, the EEOC publicly announced its contention
that mandatory employment arbitration agreements encompassing statutory
claims are inconsistent with the fundamental principles evinced in federal
discrimination laws.27' In the EEOC's view, arbitration undermines the
public policies behind these federal discrimination laws by privatizing the
enforcement of these statutes.2

Congress entrusted the federal government with the responsibility of
protecting and enforcing the public values.embodied in Title VII, the ADEA,
266. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 674.
267. Supreme Lodge, K.P. v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 32 (1924) ("Under the settled rule of this Court,
declared so frequently and uniformly as to have become axiomatic, we must accept this decision of
the highest court of the state fixing themeaning of the state legislation, as though such meaning had
been specifically expressed therein.").
268. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187 n.3. Bound by Duffield, a California district court
apologetically refused to compel arbitration of FEHA claims pursuant to a predispute arbitration
agreement. The court noted that "although the FEHA is a California statute, Duffield's holding with
respect to both Title VII and FEHA claims is an interpretation of federal law ... [which] this court
must follow, rather than the California Supreme Court's contrary view." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Banyasz, No. C-01-3106 WHO, 2001 WL 1218406 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2001) at *4.
269. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187 n.3.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994). Originally created to administer Title VII, Congress has
expanded it's jurisdiction to include ADEA and ADA claims. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory
Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1999) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
271. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition of Employment, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb/html. (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement on MandatoryArbitration]. The National
Labor Relations Board also opposes mandatory arbitration agreements. Zack, supra note 19, at 79
(citing Great Western Bank, Case No. 12-CA-16886 and Bentley's Luggage Corp., Case No. 12-CA16658 (1995)).
272. EEOC Policy Statement on MandatoryArbitration,supra note 272, at Part V.
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and the ADA.

73

It did so by granting the EEOC authority to investigate and

litigate discrimination claims, and also by creating a private right of action
for victims of alleged discrimination in the federal courts.274 The EEOC
believes that federal courts must continue to hear statutory discrimination
cases so that it can develop and interpret the law."' The public nature of

discrimination litigation is critical also because it prevents and deters others
from engaging in discriminatory practices.276
The EEOC finds arbitration to be an inadequate forum for the
enforcement of public laws for several reasons. 77 First, arbitrators are not

publicly accountable for their decisions.7 Arbitration is also inappropriate
because arbitrators are not required to issue written, reasoned opinions. 9
This stunts the development of law through precedent, and renders it

impossible for the judiciary (or Congress) to correct mistakes in statutory
interpretation or application.28 °

Furthermore, mandatory arbitration is

inherently biased against the employee, because the employer has a "repeat

player" advantage 8' As a "repeat player," not only is the employer more

experienced with the process, but the arbitrator will tend to favor the
employer as a potential source of future business.282

273. Id. at Part II-Part IV. "The basic rights protected by [Title VII] are rights which accrue to
citizens of the United States; the Federal Government has the clear obligation to see that these rights
are fully protected." Id. at Part III (quoting statement of Sen. Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 12725
(1964)).
274. Id. The Department of Justice also has authority to enforce discrimination laws through
litigation. Id.
275. Id. at Part. IV.A. Judicial and congressional review provide an additional protection for the
public values embodied in the statutes. Id. at Part IV.B. The Supreme Court essentially rejected this
argument in Gilmer when it said that courts will continue to see discrimination claims because some
employees will not be precluded from litigating claims. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
276. Id. at Part IV.C. It also publicly exposes those who violate discrimination laws. Id.
277. EEOC Policy Statement on MandatoryArbitration, supra note 272, at Part. V.
278. Id. at Part V.A. The arbitrator is accountable only to the parties, and is only concerned with
the immediate dispute she has been hired to resolve. She has no regard for the public values
reflected in the federal laws. Id.
279. Id. at Part V.A.2. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gilmer. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
280. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 272, at Part V.A.2. The
EEOC also finds arbitration inadequate, because it denies the right to a jury trial, limits discovery,
and cannot resolve class, pattern, or practice claims of discrimination. Id. at Part V.C.3
281. Id. at Part V.B. The employee, in contrast, is a "one-shot player," she will probably not
arbitrate other disputes. Additionally, arbitration may be unfair because, as the party with superior
bargaining power, the employer can manipulate arbitration procedures to its benefit. Id.
282. Id. But, as Arnendariz illustrates, courts can refuse to enforce one-sided agreements. See
supra note 226 and accompanying text.

The EEOC's final concern with mandatory arbitration is that its power
to enforce civil rights laws will be compromised, as individuals will be less
likely to report discrimination knowing that they will be unable to litigate
their claims. 3 The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gilmer,
pointing out that an arbitration agreement does not preclude employees from
filing claims with the EEOC.284 It also noted that the EEOC is still free to
investigate claims, even when a charge is not filed.285
The EEOC's criticisms may be well founded, but courts do not
generally pay much deference to EEOC Policy Statements. 86 Courts have
heard and rejected arguments supporting the EEOC's position that
mandatory employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable. 7 In light
of the Supreme Court's policy favoring arbitration, it is also unlikely to
accept the EEOC's position. 8 The EEOC will need to convince Congress
that it must take action to prohibit employers from stripping employees of a
judicial forum as a condition of employment.
2. Proposed Legislation
Lawmakers have also expressed concern regarding mandatory
employment arbitration. A bill introduced in the House of Representatives
sought to amend the FAA, such that employees would have "the right to
accept or reject the use of arbitration to resolve an employment
controversy."28 9 This bill would require that arbitration be voluntary, and
would proscribe the practice of requiring employees to agree to arbitrate
disputes as a condition of employment. 2" The Senate also proposed an
amendment to the FAA which would "provide for greater fairness in the
arbitration process for.., employees."29' Although this bill would not forbid
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements, it would require fair disclosure

283. EEOC Policy Statement on MandatoryArbitration, supra note 272, at Part V.C. Employees
must file discrimination charges with the EEOC prior to seeking judicial relief. See Julie L. Waters,
Comment, Does the Battle Over Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the EEOC's War in Fighting
Workplace Discrimination?,44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (2000) (discussing procedure for
filing a federal discrimination claim).
284. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
285. Id.
286. See generally Bales, supra note 271, at 26-35.
287. Id. at 50. The EEOC has sued employers who enforce arbitration agreements and has filed
several amicus briefs opposing employment arbitration. Id. The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to
agree with the EEOC that Title VII is inconsistent with compulsory arbitration. Id. at 38.
288. In dicta, the Court recently noted that "arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection
against discrimination prohibited by federal law." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct.
1302, 1313 (2001).
289. H.R. 613, 106th Cong. (1999).
290. Id. at § 17.
291. Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S.3210 IS, 106th Cong. (2000).
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and extensive procedural protections.292 In addition to the Armendariz rights,
among the procedural rights provided are the right to representation and
cross-examination.293 Legislation has also been introduced to amend Title
VII, the FAA, and other civil rights statutes "to prevent the involuntary
to claims that arise from unlawful employment
application of arbitration
294
discrinination.',
The California legislature is also considering a bill that would prohibit
enforcement of predispute mandatory arbitration agreements. 9 ' It would
prohibit an employer from requiring employees to waive their right to a jury
trial, to a judicial forum, and the rights guaranteed under the California
Evidence Code.296
Elected officials recognize the controversy surrounding mandatory
employment arbitration agreements. 9 They are troubled that employees are
being required to waive important rights and protections as a condition of
employment.9 Hence, we should not be surprised to see Congress and the
California legislature enacting legislation to settle this controversy soon.
VI. CONCLUSION

Is compulsory arbitration, with the conditions imposed, still a better
alternative than civil litigation in California? Employers will answer yes.
Although Armendariz makes arbitration more expensive, more time
intensive, and less final, employers will still find arbitration an attractive
alternative to litigation, because it allows them to avoid the jury and keep
allegations of discrimination from becoming a matter of public record. 99

292. Id.
293. Id. at § 2(c)(3), (6). The bill also includes provisions for a neutral arbitrator and
administrative process, hearings, discovery, timely resolution, written decisions, and small claims
opt out. Id. at § 2(c)(l)-(l 1).
294. Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999, S. 121, 106th Cong (1999); H.R. 872, 106th
Cong. (1999). The amendments would "make it clear that the powers and procedures provided
under those laws are the exclusive ones that apply only when a claim arises ...[and] would prevent
discrimination claims from being involuntarily sent to binding arbitration." 145 CONG. REc. E 287
(1999) (statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey).
295. SENATE RULES COMM., PROHIBITION ON THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS, S. AB 858, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999-2000).
296. Id.
297. See supra Part III(E).
298. See, e.g, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, S. AB 858, Reg. Sess. (Cal.

(statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
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1999). 145 CONG. REC. E 287 (1999)

The employee will also answer yes, despite the fact that this may mean
no large damage awards.3" Employees are likely to find themselves
unemployed if they refuse to sign an arbitration agreement,"' hence reality
may require that they submit to arbitration. If this is the case, these new
rules represent a significant benefit in vindicating statutory rights.
The Gardner-Denver Court noted that "a standard that adequately
insured effectuation of Title VII [and FEHA] rights in the arbitral forum
would tend to make arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and time
consuming process. And judicial enforcement of such a standard would
almost require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees'
3 2
claims.""

Armendariz, in holding that employees may be required to

arbitrate FEHA claims, has done exactly what the Court warned against in
Gardner-Denver. The Armendariz safeguards are absolutely necessary to
protect employees' rights, but they do make arbitration more procedurally
complex, expensive, and time consuming.
However, it is possible for plaintiffs to circumvent Armendariz and
compelled arbitration of statutory claims. Plaintiffs can simply append
FEHA claims to Title VII claims and file in federal court, thereby finding
their way in front of a jury.0 3 This inevitably will lead to forum shopping,
until the Supreme Court or Congress conclusively determines the
enforceability of predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.3 "
Jennifer LaFond ' °.

300. Arbitration may actually make it easier for employees to vindicate their rights.

High

litigation costs may prevent some people from bringing FEHA and Title VII claims. Armendariz
relieves the employee of most costs, and provides the protections that litigation provides. See
BALES, supra note 7, at 3.
301. See Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that an employer may fire employees who refuse to submit to binding arbitration).
302. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974). FEHA claims would be treated
like Title VII claims because the Civil Rights Act encompasses parallel state antidiscrimination
statutes. See supra text accompanying note 270.
303. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part V.
305. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law 2002.

